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Introduction  
 
What is corruption? One of the many answers to this question is: “It is a 
misuse of public office for private gain” (Svensson, 2005: 19). Though this 
short definition is widely used, it is imprecise. It intends to cover a too wide 
range of law breaking, from bribery to embezzlement to fraud, clientelism 
and secret dealings. We prefer to bring all these modes of conduct under 
the umbrella of breach of integrity. However, the concept of integrity needs 
further precision. The online Oxford Dictionary brings us one step further 
with the following definition of integrity: “The quality of being honest and 
having strong moral principles.” That leaves us to define the constituting 
elements of honesty and moral principles. We suggest that these concern 
truthfulness and behaving according to yardsticks. According to Van 
Duyne (2001), what is central in the concept is the decision making ac-
cording to yardsticks: corruption erodes the integrity of decision making 
and leads to bending or evading its standards which an honest decision 
maker should refuse. Van Duyne (2001) formulates it as follows:  
 
“Corruption is an improbity or decay in the decision-making process in 
which a decision-maker (in a private corporation or in a public service) 
consents or demands to deviate from the criterion, which should rule 
his decision making, in exchange for a reward, the promise or expecta-
tion of it”. 
 
We will use the concepts of corruption and integrity breaches interchange-
ably, but always within the framework of the integrity of decision making. 
                                                          
1  The authors are based, respectively, at Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 
and at Manchester University, UK. 
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 As we will see, it is the deep and pervasive erosion of the integrity of 
the decision making in the public administration and private sector, which 
affects the welfare of the peoples. In our study this awkward predicament  
concerns Moldova, which does not stand alone in this regard. In fact, the 
whole western Black Sea and Balkan region is characterised by a high level 
of corruption (Emerson et al., 2017; McDevit, 2015; Kononczuk et al., 
2017). On the Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 of Transparency Inter-
national, of which the scale ranges from 10 (highly corrupt) and 100 (very 
clean) and with a global average of 43, Moldova scores 31; Ukraine 30; 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 38; Albania 38; Macedonia 35; Serbia 41; Bul-
garia 43; Montenegro 43 and Romania 48 (Transparency International, 
2018). It is clear that Moldova together with Ukraine, is at the bottom of 
this apparently deeply corrupt region.  
 Corruption is a global concern and Moldova underwrites this: it is (or 
will become) a signatory of a number of international conventions against 
corruption.2 However, this legal compliance did not make the country less 
corrupt though we still lack a systematic knowledge of the backgrounds 
and facets of corruption in Moldova. This chapter aims to make a recon-
naissance by bringing together what is known about corruption in this 
country. The sources for this study are not rich: corruption in Moldova 
seems to be under-researched. The consulted sources consist mainly of 
open English language sources, mainly from Moldovan institutions and lo-
cal authors whose publications were uploaded on various websites.  
 We will first look at the common denominator underlying the corrup-
tion in this region: the Soviet heritage. 
 
 
                                                          
2  The United Nations Convention against Corruption of the United Nations, in 
force since 14 December 2005; the Inter-American Convention against Cor-
ruption of the Organization of American States, in force since 6 March 1997; 
the Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe, adopted 4 
November 1999; the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of the Council 
of Europe, adopted 27 January 1999; the EU Convention against Corruption 
involving officials of the European Union, adopted on 25 June 1997; the Afri-
can Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, adopted in 
2003; the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
369 
 
The Soviet corruption heritage 
 
Moldova is a small, relatively underdeveloped country sandwiched be-
tween Romania and Ukraine. The principality of Moldova was founded in 
the 1350s. It was controlled by the Ottoman Empire for almost 500 years 
until 1812, when the north-eastern part of the principality – Bessarabia – 
was annexed by the Russian Empire. In 1918, Bessarabia became part of 
Romania but in 1940 was annexed again by the Soviet Union. 
 Whether in Tsarist or Soviet times, corruption has been endemic. As 
Markovska (2007) comments, in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary Russia, of-
ficials were often expected to ‘live off the job’ by extracting every penny 
they could from those who depended on their services (Markovska, 2007: 
227). For Moldova it can be interpreted as a continuation of the Turkish 
style of governing the outlying provinces: officials (often Greek aristo-
crats) had to rent their position and reclaimed the expenses by living off 
their districts (the Phanariote era; Kurat and Bromley, 1976). Civil service 
positions became a commodity that could be sold or inherited (Chalidze 
(1977) quoted by Markovska and Isaeva (2007: 228). This was continued 
under the Bolshevik rule.  
 Jowitt (1983) observed that in the Soviet Union bribes “are being of-
fered and taken for everything, ranging from certificates of place of resi-
dence, to apartments, to ministerial posts in the republics” which in his 
opinion were practices that sustained the privileged political cadre. Jowitt 
(1983) comments that the purchase and sale of positions for large sums of 
money signifies the profound institutionalisation of a structure of bribery 
and graft, from the bottom to the top of the pyramid of power.  
 Stefes (2003) quotes Konstantin Simis, a Jewish lawyer who was forced 
to leave the Soviet Union, who aptly observed: “it can be stated without 
fear of exaggeration that the average Soviet citizen was accompanied by 
bribery from womb to tomb”. It exerted control over the distribution of the 
most basic scarce resources and services, causing a frantic search (Stefes, 
2003; Clark and Wildavsky, 1990: 217). There were no control mecha-
nisms in the one party state. Corrupt conduct was expected from most lead-
ing cadre: declining participation was unofficially sanctioned (Simis, 1982: 
218). Finally, the rules that structured corrupt activities were refined and 
commonly known (Vaksberg, 1991: 6). 
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 Stefes (2003) poses the question: how did the myriad of opportunities 
to take bribes turn into a system of corruption? He believes that this was 
enabled by a system of clientelism within the state-party apparatus. He be-
lieves clientelism was built initially around the career ambitions of Soviet 
officials who realised that without the patronage there were no career pro-
spects as socialist orthodoxy prevented a meritocratic promotion system to 
develop. So promotion became based on patronage. 
 This system created a profitable leverage towards citizens in need of 
permits and licenses (Simis, 1977: 38). Given the civil servants’ power to 
stall, the citizens were accomplices as well as extorted victims (Stefes, 
2003; Simis, 1982: 230). All ex-Soviet states shared this system. 
 
 
Towards capturing the Moldova state 
 
Apparently the Moldovan people accepted this heritage of ‘corrupt busi-
ness as usual’: paying bribes as an expected expense in getting served by 
underpaid officials who considered these as regular fringe benefits.  
 Apart from this heritage, ‘liberated’ Moldova was the only Soviet suc-
cessor state, which did not welcome its birth: the majority of the population 
speaks Romanian and wanted to join Romania. This was not to the liking 
of the Russian speaking minority (9%) living east of the Dniester. With 
Russian armed support the Russian minority revolted in March 1992 and 
declared its own state: Transnistria, recognised by no other state but Rus-
sia. Meanwhile the Romanian state, just having cast off the oppression of 
its socialist leader Ceaucescu, showed little enthusiasm to embrace ‘little 
sister’ Modova (Caɫus, 2016: 16). “Where to belong to?” remained an un-
answered question: should Moldova move to the west and the EU or to-
wards Putin’s Russia? In populist versions this easy to understand divide 
remained dominant in all rhetoric. This went at the expense of proper dem-
ocratic policy building from a social and economic ideas and conceptions. 
 As a corollary Moldova had to start its life without popular identifica-
tion, feelings of belonging to a shared tradition, history, or a national pride. 
Who loves Moldova? Its own citizens in the last place, a sentiment rein-
forced by the dislike of its corrupt elite (Caɫus, 2016; Ch. 1 and p. 34). This 
is a socio-political undertone explaining the fragile state building.  
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 Given this Soviet pre-history, corruption was not a new problem, as 
Markovska (2007) observed. New was Moldova’s road to an authoritarian 
regime. Unlike in its neighbour state Ukraine (Konończuk et al., 2017), 
Moldova developed in the first decade of its existence a genuine multi-
party system and at every election the voters removed the then ruling party 
or coalition from office. The pluralism was also reflected in the many-sided 
media. However, as indicated above, this pluralism had no internal content 
derived from social-economic ideas. Actually, the Moldovan people expe-
rienced all this pluralism not as a democracy but as chaos and inefficiency. 
In an opinion survey in 2001, 57% of the interviewees expressed their pref-
erence for an old-fashioned one-party system, which was also considered 
to be less corrupt (Caɫus, 2016a: 24). Apparently the people had not learned 
much from history. 
 At the election of 2001, the people got what it wanted, but at the ex-
pense of more corruption and a captured state. The Party of Communists 
obtained a majority in Parliament of 71 out of 101 seats. Its leader, Vladi-
mir Voronin, became the President. Though formally the President has lit-
tle power, Voronin controlled his party fully and through that Parliament. 
Nominating his cabinet allowed him to rule as if constitutional restrictions 
on the presidency did not exist (Caɫus, 2016a). Not only did he pack the 
cabinet with loyal followers, he also succeeded in subordinating the system 
of justice to his will by appointing loyal judges and prosecutors (Prosecutor 
General Office and Supreme Court). Next he extended his party’s influence 
to the public media. An important extension of power consisted of weak-
ening the local administrative units which numbers were enlarged from 12 
to 32 by splitting them up (2002). This shrinking of size made them finan-
cially more dependent on the central government that now could better in-
fluence local elections. After capturing the state apparatus, the real ‘big 
grab’ was done by Voronin’s son Oleg using his father’s influence and 
connections to extend his businesses. Apart from intimidations, he claimed 
that firms owed him money and used false court orders from a bribed judge 
to reclaim these fake ‘debts’ (Caɫus, 2016a:  24).  
 Voronin completed the constitutional two terms as president till 2009, 
after which elections were held. After a lot of bickering for the election of 
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a President3, Parliament was dissolved and snap elections were held, in 
which the Communists were defeated by what has been called the Alliance 
for European Integration (AEI), consisting of four opposition parties. The 
two oligarch party leaders of the two biggest parties were Vlad Filat (Lib-
eral Democrats) and Vlad Plahotniuc (Democratic Party Moldova). Did 
this herald a change from the grabbing and greed of Voronin and son? 
 
 
Perfecting state capture 
 
Other than the name of the new coalition suggests – working towards Eu-
rope and its standards – the leaders of the parties in power showed hardly 
genuine interest in working towards the EU unless their interests were not 
threatened (BTI, Country report Moldova, 2018: §14). In fact, there is no 
other real programme but to enjoy the benefits of a EU rapprochement, in 
particular the coveted visa free travelling and EU development funds. 
There is a lot of lip service to keep EU delegates and international partners 
happy.  
 The two leaders who mattered are Vladimir Plahotniuc and Vladimir 
Filat. Plahotniuc is chairman of the Democratic Party (PDM). He is con-
sidered to be the wealthiest businessman in the country, with his net worth 
estimated at hundreds of million to over a billion dollars. Filat was a former 
Prime Minister and the President of Moldova’s center-right Liberal Dem-
ocratic Party (PLDM). His critics accuse him of having profited from cor-
rupt privatisation practices. 
 In October 2009, less than a month after the AEI was sworn in, it made 
Parliament to adopt a law on public functions and the statute of the civil 
servants. This allowed the government to appoint or dismiss staff of the 
judiciary, law enforcement and regulatory bodies. For example: chairper-
sons and vice-chairpersons, the Prosecutor General and deputies, judges of 
the Constitutional Court (CC), the Supreme Council of Magistracy (SCM), 
and director and deputies of National Bank, the National Anti-corruption 
                                                          
3  According to Wikileak cables Voronin offered Marian Lupu who had recently 
crossed-over from the Communist to the Democratic Party, $ 10 million for 
power sharing: he would become Speaker and Lupu president. But Lupu de-
clined. www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/02/wikileaks-cables-moldova-
voronin-bribe Accessed 7-10-2018.  
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Centre and Chairperson and members of the Central Election Commis-
sion.4 In a ruling of 29 December 2010, concerning the dismissal of the 
Chairperson of the Supreme Court the Constitutional Court mitigated this 
arrogation of power by differentiating between the institutions of high po-
litical and high public interest, such as the courts which should be protected 
against political interference. However, the government mostly flouted this 
mandatory ruling. In fact, the coalition followed the lines of its secret 
agreement of August 2008 on the division of the positions between the 
three member parties. The Liberal Democrats under Filat ‘got’ the Central 
Election Commission (Transparency International et al., 2017:  8). The 
Democratic Party of Moldova (DPM) of Plahotniuc ‘got’ a strong foothold 
in the justice system which proved later to be of a most strategic value: the 
General Prosecutor’s Office, that he did not hesitate to use for his own 
purposes. In addition, he got a preponderant influence over the Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Council of Magistracy and indirectly the courts of jus-
tice. With a touch of wry irony, Plahotniuc also got the anti-corruption 
bodies in his grip.  
 These two oligarchs, Filat of the Liberals Democratic Party of Moldova 
(DLPM) and Plahotniuc of the Democratic Party of Moldova shared the 
centre of political power. They proved also to be serious rivals, which is a 
formula for political instability. However, during the first coalition years 
they kept up appearances of stability to the EU in view of the coveted As-
sociation Agreement with the EU and the liberalisation of the EU visa re-
gime in 2014. Also, as their majority was slim, it was in their interest to 
avoid new elections, though tensions were mounting. Prime Minister Filat, 
expressed after a few years his misgivings about the appointment policy 
and warned on July 2011 against what he qualified as the mafiotisation of 
the Republic (TI et al., 2017: 6). He also admitted that his party got control 
of the Central Election Commission, a perfect position for election manip-
ulation. These outpourings lowered his trust with the population of whom 
two third considers elections unfair (Transparency International and CMI, 
2017). 
 Filat’s influence declined after an attempt to reclaim control over the 
General Prosecutor’s Office in 2013 and lost subsequently his position as 
                                                          
4  For a full list see Transparency International et al., 2017, p. 5 
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Prime Minister. Meanwhile, Plahotniuc’ influence was increasing by brib-
ery and intimidation (Caɫus, 2016a). The final battle between the two oli-
garchs two years later is of interest because it revealed how subserviently 
the Prosecutor General Office, Mr Harunjen, and the courts operated.  
 The opportunity to settle accounts came when the One Billion Banking 
Theft came to the open and Filat was accused by the main suspect Ilan Shor 
of passive corruption. As Plahotniuc ‘owns’ the General Prosecution Of-
fice he made the deputy Prosecutor come into rapid action against his rival. 
On October 2015, Parliament was informed of the alleged Filat’s wrong-
doing and while violating its own procedural rules, hastily stripped him of 
his immunity, whereupon the Prosecutor General had him arrested imme-
diately (TI, 2017). After a trial behind closed doors he was convicted to 
nine years prison. Now Plahotniuc was the only main oligarch left. He 
could be satisfied: he was now a ‘mono-garch’. Having no other public 
position, he could dominate the ‘ship of state’ without any accountability. 
 
 
The functioning of the ‘ship of state’ 
 
The ‘ship of state’ is a metaphor for describing the government as standing 
on the command bridge; as the legislative determining the course; the 
mechanisms of the rule of law system to maintain order, and the executive 
to follow orders to keep the ship afloat. How is the Moldovan ship of state 
sailing?  
 
1. Parliament and political parties 
 
When there is systematic and grand corruption, there is most often a direct 
political link because at this level political decision making processes are 
affected. This does not only concern the direct benefits, but also the system 
of mutual protection: corrupt actors must have the clout to thwart anti-cor-
ruption measures and policies. That is often denoted with the abstract eu-
phemism: “there is no political will to fight corruption”. That is too free-
floating: one must look at the perpetrators and all who abet their corrupt 
conduct. In our narrative this concerns corrupt politicians and their parties 
in the Moldovan Parliament of which the most important are: 
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▪ The Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) 
▪ Party of Socialists of Republic of Moldova (PSRM) 
▪ Party of Communists of Republic Moldova  (PCRM) 
▪ The Democratic Party of Moldova  (DPM) 
▪ The Liberal Party (LP) 
 
We have noted earlier that in Moldovan politics the content of party pro-
grammes are irrelevant. Relevant are the leading persons, or as the chair-
man of the Constitutional Court observed: “Moldovan political parties are 
authoritarian entities, dominated by ‘Leader’s cult’, without internal de-
mocracy and political visions”.5 Hence we focus on politically leading ac-
tors: not a full picture gallery of ‘who is who’, but only those of whom 
enough is known in relation to systematic corruption. 
 In the previous sections we have already met Vladimir Voronin of the 
communist party PCRM who ruled two terms from 2001-2009. As men-
tioned, he is important because he set out to subordinate the administration 
of justice by skilfully appointing colourless and pliant figures on key posi-
tions (Caɫus, 2016). As we have seen, next came the regional administra-
tion, made financially dependent on the central government: non-com-
munist districts got less money (Caɫus, 2016a: 24). His son Oleg benefitted 
from public contracts and preferences. With the support of corrupt judges 
he raided allegedly indebted corporations. 
 The scene changed in 2009, when this ‘one-party grabbing’ was re-
placed by a series of coalition governments of parties who were also not 
averse of sharing the grabbing spree.  
 Apart from that, the coalition worked uneasily together under their um-
brella of the Alliance for European Integration. Nominally pro-Europe, 
their main energy was devoted to dividing the spoils including the ‘rights’ 
to nominate the top ranks of the law enforcement and supervisory institu-
tions such as prosecutor general, chief of the fiscal service, governor of the 
National Bank of Moldova or the chief of the Central Electoral Commis-
sion (included in a confidential protocol August 2009). Tensions between 
the liberals under Filat and Democrats under Plahotniuc soured their rela-
tion. It came to a culmination with the arrest of the Filat (October, 2015) 
                                                          
5  https://www.europalibera.org/a/27209223.html. 
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because of suspicions of passive corruption involvement and his hasty trial 
as described in the previous section (see p. 384). 
 With the main rival neutralised the power relation in Parliament had 
changed. Still, Plahotniuc’ DPM was too small: it got only 12-16% of the 
votes at the elections. To get more seats the businessman came to the fore: 
Bribery was one of the convincing methods to lure MPs from another par-
ties (‘floor crossing’). A communist MP recalled: “An MP from DPM pro-
posed me a very consistent remuneration and functions for relatives to 
leave the faction” (Transparency International et al., 2017: 14). The result 
was a ‘floor crossing’ to the DPM: 14 communist MPs, two liberal and one 
socialist MP and 17 of the liberal democrats changed sides to the DPM.6 
With this outcome one can say that the mono-garch, Plahotniuc, succeeded 
in capturing the Moldovan legislature, while he has no official position in 
any of the branches of public administration or Parliament. 
 Floor crossing was the leverage to get controversial bills accepted. For 
example, against all advice and protests from western partners (US, EU) 
and international institutions (IMF, OECD), Parliament adopted in July 
2018 the Fiscal Reform Package, together with Capital Amnesty implying 
that illegal or non-reported funds or assets can be legalised at a 3% pay-
ment of the declared value, while the normal income tax rate is 7-18%. The 
withheld assets declarations can be submitted 1 December 2018 till 28 Feb-
ruary 2019. In fact this is money laundering by law.   
 
2. The functioning of the juridical system  
 
It is difficult to determine to what extent the law enforcement system op-
erates adequately and impartially: what are the yardsticks for a ‘fair trial’? 
This is a matter of interpretation. In some cases, there is little room for 
interpretation. For example, the useless display of police power in the trial 
against Filat compared to the soft treatment of the main criminal operator, 
Ilan Shor. Therefore, we restrict our search to explicit critical mentions in 
the studies and reports on the administration of justice.  
 There are different aims for abusing the judicial system. In the first 
place, one can exert pressure to get a favourable verdict or ruling from the 
                                                          
6  Unsurprisingly, three attempts to introduce a bill against this practice of floor 
crossing were halted. 
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court; in the second place, the law enforcement system can be used to in-
timidate opponents or, in the third place, to punish officials for ‘wrong de-
cisions’: against the interest of the ruling party or to deter others. Examples 
will be given below. 
 One of the early critical mentions came from one of the main actors: 
Filat himself, criticising that the DPM (rather, Plahotniuc himself) has a 
decisive influence on appointments for the top functions:  in the judiciary, 
General Prosecution Office and National Anti-Corruption Centre (Trans-
parency International el al., 2017) and other supervisory and regulatory 
bodies. This is what Filat called the mafiotization of top appointments (see, 
TI, 2017: 5): staffing essential institutions with compliant personnel. How-
ever, this is a strong statement from someone being directly ‘in the know’ 
while regretting that his influence was on the wane. Are there more sources 
which may shed light on this delicate matter of lack of judicial integrity? 
 Though systematic research is lacking, the cases described in the liter-
ature and sometimes also the public upheaval caused by a suspicious ver-
dict provide good illustrations of how the legal apparatus can be abused. 
Should that all be attributed to the DPM and behind that Vlad Plahotniuc? 
There is consensus about this among authors (Caɫus, 2016a; Gribincea, 
2017; Hriptievski, 2017; Prohnitchi, 2018), however, consensus is no 
proof. Allegations that the Supreme Court of Justice is under influence of 
Plahotniuc through his power of appointment is of course refuted by the 
president of this Court, but questions remain. The same applies to the Pros-
ecutor General, Harunjen, under whose management the Anti-Corruption 
Prosecution Service hardly functioned, who showed very little zeal in han-
dling the One Billion Bank Theft, and who lives in a dwelling which cannot 
be paid from his salary. All this was no hindrance to an expeditious ap-
pointment on 8 December 2016, behind closed doors (Transparency Inter-
national, 2017; Gribincea, 2017). In the next section we provide a selection 
of examples of (ab)using the system of justice. 
 
a. Favouritism, intimidation or punishment 
 
Sorin Pleşca 
The case against Sorin Pleşca may illustrate the political influence on the 
outcome of a prosecution. In March 2016 Sorin Pleşca shot his brother “by 
accident”. He ran away and stayed two weeks in hiding after which he was 
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found. He was charged with “murder from imprudence” (“death by crimi-
nal negligence”), but after two and a half month the case was closed as “the 
parties reached an agreement”. How could the prosecutor reach such a de-
cision in a man-slaughter case? At the end of the year Sorin got a job at the 
embassy of Moldova in Turkey and his father, Nae-Simion Pleşca, sitting 
in Parliament for the LDPM defected to the DPM of Plahotniuc. Together 
with five other turncoats he helped to install the new Filip government of 
the same DPM. (TI et al., 2017: 27). 
 
Valeriu Guma 
This MP for the DPM (Plahotniuc) was convicted in April 2013, in Roma-
nia for corrupting the General Director of the State Assets Recovery to four 
years imprisonment. However, Guma absconded to Moldova. Thereupon, 
the Court in Bucharest requested the Moldovan authorities to recognise the 
verdict and execute the punishment (transfer of execution of verdicts). But 
Guma as MP still enjoyed the privilege of immunity, which the Parliament 
did not want to withdraw. When his immunity expired, the Moldavian 
Court ignored the Romanian request and converted the punishment into a 
suspended imprisonment of four years. 
 
Mayor Filipov of the town Taraclia 
Mayor Filipov was accused of cutting 31 trees in the courtyard of the town 
hall, though this was the responsibility of specialised services in the mu-
nicipality. He was nevertheless prosecuted for causing damage, but was in 
first instance acquitted. However, the Cahul Court of Appeal convicted 
him to a fine and compensation of the damage. More important, in addition, 
he was also deprived of the right to hold public office for two years, which 
effectively crippled him politically. The SCJ annulled this sentence and 
referred the case for retrial. The mayor stated that this was a revenge for 
his refusal to join the DPM in the local elections in 2015 (Gribincea, 
2017).7  
 
 
                                                          
7  To many this did not appear a loose accusation. The Congress of Local Au-
thorities from Moldova demanded reinstalling him as mayor. Even the EU am-
bassador and the US embassy expressed their concern, a very exceptionally 
step. 
379 
 
The case of Basarabeasca’s mayor 
In March 2017 the mayor of Basarabeasca, Valentin Cumpoies, was ar-
rested and put into preventive custody for 30 days. The charge was negli-
gence in preventing a citizen to abuse his 13 year old daughter to provide 
sexual services. Whether this misconduct or the mayor’s liability was 
proven is not known: the case is pending, but the damage to the mayor is 
done. Cumpoies is member of Our Party, an extra-parliamentary party 
highly critical of Plahotniuc and his DPM. The Congress of Local Author-
ities of Moldova protested strongly against this “unprecedented and unjus-
tified arrest” (TI et al., 2017: 30).  
 
The three stealing ministers 
In the Moldovan media these examples were discussed as examples of ‘se-
lective justice’ with three ministers who were accused of abuse of office: 
illegally selling state property in February 2013. One minister was of the 
democratic party (Plahotniuc), the others liberal democrats. The latter ac-
cused saw their case quickly sent to court. The democrat minister’s case 
was halted, despite documented accusations by the accountant (May 2013). 
This got public, but still no prosecution followed (Gribincea, 2017: 5). 
 
The case of judge Manole 
The case of Domnica Manole, judge at the Chisinau Court of Appeals, is 
illustrative for the whole judicial system in Moldova. The case concerns an 
attempt of a group of citizens to organise a referendum on the constitution. 
This is only possible with 200.000 signatures including 20.000 from at 
least half the administrative units as counted in 2000. The referendum 
group met these conditions, but Central Election Commission (CEC) re-
fused to organise a referendum. In appeal the Court annulled the ruling of 
the CEC, which went in appeal against at the Supreme Court of Justice 
(SCJ). April 2016, the appeal verdict was annulled and the decision of the 
CEC upheld. The reason was that after the referendum law of 2000, under 
the communist leadership of Voronin a new regional division of the coun-
try was determined in 2002 with many more but smaller units. This implied 
that meeting the referendum conditions became impossible: some units did 
not even have enough voters. However, the referendum law was never 
adapted to this new regional division. So, judge Manole interpreted the law 
such that this referendum can work with the old regional division of 2000, 
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while the SCJ ruled that only the 2002 division was valid. That was not the 
end of the matter. The SCJ took seriously offence at judge Manole daring 
to interpret the law: that is the privilege of the Constitutional Court. Sub-
sequently, on 23rd May 2016, the CEC submitted a criminal complaint of 
abuse of office against the judge to the General Prosecution Office. The 
next day, with unusual speed, the Interim Prosecutor requested the Supe-
rior Council of Magistrates permission to initiate criminal procedures. In a 
closed session the Council gave permission, against which Manole ap-
pealed at the SCJ, but now the procedure began to stall: after a year the 
case still has not been reviewed and judge Manole remains suspended.  
The case of Manole was considered important for the independence of 
the judiciary and caused much upheaval. Judges from the Chisinau Court 
of appeal expressed their support for the judge and also the EU and the US 
embassies expressed again their concern.  
 The struggle of judge Manola with the hierarchy of the justice system 
is important for three reasons. In the first place, the referendum on the con-
stitution was the last thing the ruling elite wanted: it was prepared to do 
anything to forestall it. In the second place, though the danger of a refer-
endum was in the end averted by the SCJ, the DPM – through their proxies 
in the CEC and General Prosecutor – may have aimed to make their point: 
“don’t dare to interpret the constitution by yourself or else we initiate a 
criminal investigation”, even if interpreting laws is the main metier of 
judges. In the third place, by making this point the ruling elite clearly set a 
limit to the judicial independence, as was also observed by one of the pro-
testing SCJ judges: to “initiate criminal investigation in this case sets a 
dangerous precedent for the independence of judiciary”. 
 Transparency International et al., (2018) is more direct in their conclu-
sion: there are strong reasons to doubt the independence of the judiciary. 
The appointment power of the DPM regarding the top echelons of the ju-
diciary, stemming from the informal interparty agreement 2009/2010, and 
a personnel policy (see below) enables a powerful influence on the work 
of the courts. We will therefore discuss these personnel management tools 
next. 
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b. Appointment and promotion 
 
Appointment and promotion can be considered very effective bribes: it is 
a once in a lifetime corruption, after which one remains entangled in a pa-
tron-client relationship. And it is cheap: no money changes hands.  
 Concerning the important function of the President of the Supreme 
Court of Justice, there is no documented evidence supporting Filat’s claim 
that the Liberal Party had the ‘right’ to nominate the President or other 
staff. With the demise of Filat, Plahotniuc would have taken over. Natu-
rally the President, Poalelungi, denies emphatically that he would be a 
‘Plahotniuc man’. Nevertheless, there are no examples of SCJ decisions 
which were opposed to the interests of DPM or the business network of 
Plahotniuc. See Manola’s fate above, who issued a verdict that could harm 
the elite’s interests. 
 The legal procedure of appointment and promotion looks solidly based 
on merits. The selection of candidate judges or the promotion of judges 
proceeds in a two-step way (Transparency International et al., 2017; Hrip-
tievschi, 2017). There are: (1) the graduation examination at the National 
Institute of Justice (for candidate judges) or performance evaluation (for 
judges) and (2) the evaluation by the Career and Selection Board. This 
Career Board inspects the points in the selection and promotion reports and 
gives a reasoned judgment. This is subsequently presented to the Superior 
Council of Magistracy (SCM), the supervisory body partly politically ap-
pointed. The SCM must propose the candidates or judges with the highest 
marks to the President of Moldova for an appointment or promotion. What 
do we know about this procedure based on merits only? 
 It appears that the SCM hardly takes notice of the marking by the Career 
Board. Transparency International et al. (2017: 17) Hriptievschi (2017) 
and (Gribinscea, 2017) observed that candidates or judges with lower 
points are systematically preferred to candidates with higher points: the 
authors mention eleven cases (six for the Courts of Appeal and five for the 
Supreme Court) while no reasons were given for ignoring the rating of the 
Career Board.  
 There are also many cases with ‘integrity issues’, in which proposed 
candidates or judges’ promotions were refused by the President: about 80 
in the period 2002-2015. The President’s reasons were: discrediting jus-
tice; lack of objectivity; possession of unjustified wealth or other ‘integrity 
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issues’. The SCM has a considerable power to ignore the refusal of the 
President, because he can refuse only once: by again proposing the rejected 
candidate with a two-third majority the SCM proposal must be accepted, 
whether reasons are given or not (mostly). So, despite the serious reasons 
of the President for not accepting candidates or promotions, the SCM 
maintained 55 questionable proposals: again no reasons provided (Trans-
parency International, et al., 2017: 18). 
 The way the top position of deputy President of the Supreme Court was 
filled, is telling. First, on April 2015,  a vacancy was created by accusing 
the then deputy President of manipulating a new Integrated Case Manage-
ment System. She felt pressured to resign which may have been the inten-
tion: nothing was heard of this serious allegation, while the vacancy re-
mained open. The candidate judge for this position, an outspoken person-
ality, was passed, again no reasons given. At the end (December 2016) an 
inconspicuous judge with a history of controversial decisions was proposed 
instead (Hriptievschi, 2017). 
It is also striking that not having declared one’s income and assets fully, 
remained unheeded, also with appointments at the SCJ which should be a 
role model. One judge was low in the ranking, had little experience and 
failed asset declaration: she stated that her Porsch was bought for only € 
500. Still, she was hastily proposed for appointment – even before the in-
vestigation of her asset declaration. In a Public Appeal on 8 February 2016, 
Civil Society Organisations expressed their concern about the nomination 
policy of the SCM, repeatedly ignoring the Presidents references at ‘integ-
rity issues’ of candidates.8 
 There are also indications that in 2012, the SCM was warned by the 
Security and Intelligence Service of the involvement of judges in the Rus-
sian Laundromat. However, the SCM did not interfere till 2016. Then a 
number of judges involved got a positive evaluation and were promoted to 
administrative positions or the Court of Appeal (TI et al., 2017: 32).  
 It is almost a euphemism to say that the functioning of the Superior 
Council of Magistracy in matters of appointment and promotion is worry-
ing. It is selective and non-transparent, giving the impression of punishing 
judges with a frank mind and furthering judges with an integrity risk. By 
                                                          
8  http://crjm.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2016-02-08-Apel-CarieraJudeca-
tori-ENG.pdf 
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not giving reasons for its decisions the SCM shirks public accountability 
(Hriptievschi (2017). 
 
c. Tools against integrity breaches in the judiciary 
 
Within the structure of the justice system there are tools to prevent or sanc-
tion breaches of integrity principles. How do these function? TI et al. 
(2017: 20) and Hriptievschi (2017) inspected a number of cases to deter-
mine how the internal correction system responded to signs of breaches of 
integrity. As far as the signs came from civil society, for example from 
investigative journalists, the correction system is hardly functioning, rein-
forcing the lack of trust of 89,6% expressed by respondents in the Public 
Opinion Barometer.9  
 As we have already observed in the sections above, the asset declaration 
by judges is repeatedly ignored. If that is brought to the attention of the 
superiors, no action follows with one exception: one judge was fined with 
€ 750 for defects in her asset declaration.  
 A tool to prevent corruption is to randomise the distribution of cases 
over the judges in the courts. However, this system is also vulnerable to 
manipulation or suitable to accuse someone of having done so. We men-
tioned the example of the deputy President of the SCJ who was in 2015 
accused of such a manipulation, allegedly just to get rid of the judge, an 
often observed ploy to harass someone out of the organisation. 
 The procedure for establishing disciplinary responsibility is a compli-
cated tool: it exists of five levels. On each level a disciplinary case can be 
halted, while serious doubts about the integrity of the judge remain. The 
first level is the Judicial Inspection, which examines the complaint which 
it can reject. There were suspicions that the Judicial Inspection do not in-
vestigate sufficiently, particularly in cases in which chairpersons or judges 
from higher courts were involved (Hriptievschi, 2017). In one case the 
Judge-Inspector was himself in conflict of interest.10 Evidence can also be 
ignored, such as the audio-recording of the President of the Rîșcani Court, 
shouting and fulminating against a defence attorney and threatening his 
                                                          
9  Institute for Public Policies, Public Opinion Barometer, October 2016: 
http://www.bop.ipp.md/result?type=bar. 
10  The President of the Court he investigated was the judge who examined a case 
in which the Inspector’s wife was involved (Transparency International, et al., 
2017:21). 
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client. The Disciplinary Board stopped the procedure for lack of evidence. 
In various cases in which judges from the SCJ were involved the SCM 
annulled the disciplinary sanctions (Transparency International et al., 
2017: 21-22). 
 To conclude, there are serious indications that the disciplinary proce-
dures are used selectively and ineffectively. They cannot be considered to 
have a preventive or ‘self-cleaning’ function to further integrity. 
 Altogether there are ample indications that the system of justice is ill-
equipped to keep its own part of the ‘ship of state’ clean. There are severe 
doubts of its independence: it is often selective and non-transparent. How 
that looks like is illustrated by the ill-famous Billion Bank Theft. 
 
d. The Billion Bank Theft 
 
The great Moldovan Bank Robbery sounds like the title of a caper movie 
– it isn’t! Over a period of two years, approximately 1 billion dollars were 
embezzled from three Moldovan banks causing them to collapse in No-
vember 2014. The banks concerned were: Unibank (UB); Banka Sociala 
(BS) and Banca de Economii Moldova (BEM). According to a report in 
February 2017 by the London based auditing firm, Kroll, the three banks 
were subject to a large co-ordinated fraud from 2012 to 2014. The fraud 
was committed by issuing of hundreds of loans to linked companies. The 
majority of the loans with no or fake collateral were processed or laundered 
through two Latvian banks. Part of the loan funds were then channelled 
back to Moldova to repay existing loans and to allow the continuation of 
more dubious lending. At least $600 million was distributed to other des-
tinations: shell firms in the UK and offshore corporations (Kroll, 2017).   
 A large number of Moldovan companies were judged to be working 
together on this fraud. The companies were linked to a Mr Ilan Shor, high 
manager of the BEM and of the Shor Group. According to Kroll (2017), at 
least 77 companies with accounts at the three Moldovan banks concerned 
made up this group of companies. Individuals and companies linked to the 
Shor group increased their ownership interest by buying shares in the three 
Moldovan banks allowing them control of management. Companies linked 
to the Shor group also provided the required corporate and bank structures 
enabling this fraud.  
The aftermath: trials, convictions and asset recovery  
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Though this heist was enormous and well organised, what is important in 
our narrative is the way it was handled. In the first place, according to the 
Centre for Combating Economic Crime and Corruption (no date), the re-
sponse of the government was slow, secretive and selective, mainly target-
ing political rivals in the ruling coalition: most important the earlier men-
tioned Vlad Filat.11 In the second place, there was also not much transpar-
ency in the handling of this case: the extent of the fraud came only piece-
meal to the open. The Kroll investigative report was not intended for pub-
lication but was leaked anyhow. The investigative team of journalists, 
working in an association Zeppelin Investigations (2018), judged the report 
shallow and incomplete. The follow-up report is not yet available. The se-
cret attempt to bail out three affected banks was revealed nevertheless and 
led to steep inflation, the fall of the government and broad public protests.  
 Naturally, the protest of the public was directed against the political and 
economic elite suspected of having a stake in the scam, in the first place 
the oligarch Plachotniuc. However, there was no evidence of his direct in-
volvement: no “smoking gun”. It remained unclear who benefitted of this 
robbery: the number of beneficiaries should be far larger than the handful 
prosecuted defendants. Fourteen acting or former judges and three bailiffs 
have been arrested for their alleged involvement Reuters (2017) mentions 
that 40 people have either benefitted from the scam or facilitated it. 
 The three defendants getting the main law enforcement and media at-
tention were: Vlad Filat, the ex-Prime Minister and now opponent to 
Plahotniuc; the young rich businessman and politician, Ilat Shor, the pre-
vious chairman of Banca di Economii and mayor of the small town Orhei 
in the centre of Moldova. The third defendant was Veaceslav Platon, busi-
nessman and parliamentarian.  
 As mentioned, Shor was leading the so-called Shor Group and was the 
main operator of the scheme. He was arrested and placed under house ar-
rest in May 2015 but nevertheless allowed to run for mayor of the small 
town Orhei, which he surprisingly won with 62% of the votes. In June 
2016, he was arrested again and charged, but after two months custody 
released after denouncing all accomplices involved, in particular disclos-
ing the bribes ($250 million and expensive cars) he gave to ex-Prime Min-
ister Filat. However, for this active bribery he was not prosecuted. That 
                                                          
11  http://www.cccec.md/the-moldovan-banking-scandal/ 
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omission did not save him: in June 2017, he was convicted for fraud and 
money laundering and sentenced to seven years and six months imprison-
ment. He called it all a conspiracy of the government and NGOs against 
him. He appealed against this sentence and pending this appeal was re-
leased to return to the mayor’s office (Transparency International et al., 
2017).  
 His investigation and trial took more than two years with the appeal 
procedure still on-going. At the time of writing he succeeded in drawing 
out the trial procedures (or was allowed to). 
 Filat got a rougher and also much quicker treatment: six months till the 
verdict in first instance, and eight month for the appeal procedure (Trans-
parency International et al., 2017: 12). As mentioned in the previous sec-
tion, after being accused by Shor to have received money and cars, the 
Prosecutor General had him arrested in Parliament with a lot of police 
showing. In Juni 2016, Filat was sentenced for passive corruption and con-
victed to nine years imprisonment. In addition, he was banned from hold-
ing public offices for the term of five years. The trial was behind closed 
doors and the verdict was not publicised. Only PublikaTV of Vlad Plahot-
niuc was allowed to be present. Throughout the trial he was surrounded by 
an excessive number of Special Forces officers.12 Filat appealed to the Su-
preme Court of Justice and the European Court for Human Rights of which 
the procedure is still pending.  
 This was still mild compared to the sentence meted out to the third per-
petrator in this scheme: Veaceslav Platon, with Shor also heavily involved 
in the $ 20 billion Russian laundromat which ran through Moldovan banks 
(Zeppelin investigations, 2018). He was charged with stealing $40 million 
from the Banca de Economii. Platon was barred from his trial because of 
‘bad behaviour’. Also to the public, the trial proceeded behind closed 
doors. Only the verdict was read in public (April 2017), with the defendant 
present. He used to occasion to shout to his judges: “Judges, look into my 
eye! Aren’t you ashamed? This is not a sentence, this is a politically rigged 
inquisition orchestrated by your master, Vlad Plahotniuc, who should be 
                                                          
12  https://en.crimemoldova.com/news/social/vlad-filat-sues-moldova-to-the-eu-
ropean-court-of-human-rights-for-violating-his-rights-in-the-trial/ 
 http://www.intellinews.com/former-pm-filat-sues-moldova-through-euro-
pean-court-of-human-rights-127058/  
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put in prison himself! This is not a trial, this is Plahotniuc’s menagerie.” 
Platon was convicted to 18 years imprisonment.13   
 The aftermath of the mega fraud in terms of asset recovery remains un-
mentioned as nothing has been recovered thus far. The same applies to the 
beneficiaries of these huge sums of money. There are persistent indications 
that the National Bank, some MPs and the Supreme Council of Magistracy 
were informed at an early stage of the scam. Also the Prosecutor General 
showed no sense of urgency to come into action (Gribincea, 2018). Despite 
lofty intentions about funds recovery, there is no orderly asset recovery 
report available. Also the EU foreign affairs Commissioner Morgherini 
called in May 2018 for more recovery action, but in vain. 
 To summarise: the prosecution and trials displayed a high degree of se-
lectivity, bias in terms of treatment and severity of sentence and lack of 
transparency. The main criminal operator, Shor, was allowed to draw out 
all procedures, remaining at large as mayor of Orhei, while the other de-
fendants were immediately put in custody. There was no legal transpar-
ency: the trials were behind closed doors and verdicts were not publicised.  
 
3. The executive and corruption 
 
Extending the metaphor of the ship of state to the executive of Moldova, 
would depict a boat’s ‘bridge’ with the Prime Minister ‘at the helm’ sup-
ported by his responsible ministers and deputy ministers with the President 
as a ceremonial captain. However, this picture is far removed from the pre-
sent state of affairs. Since 2009 there have been six governments. The 
changes were not a consequence of a battle of ideas derived from  party 
programmes but of a of the disagreement of the division of the spoils be-
tween the democrats (DPM-Plahotniuc), the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDPM-Filat) and the Liberal under Ghimpiu. This bickering went on and 
off, thinly concealed from the wester sponsors of the poor country. The big 
1-Billion bank robbery caused additional instability and street protests. The 
government resigned. 
                                                          
13  https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/416902.html  
 Apart from these leading suspects, two other accomplices were mentioned as 
convicted for this scam to four and five year imprisonment.  
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 The new government (Democrats and Liberals), was headed by the 
weak and pliant Plahotniuc-man: Paval Filip. He was installed in January 
2016 during an undisclosed, late-night ceremony which was only later con-
firmed by a press release from the president’s office (Transparency Inter-
national et al., 2017: 36).14  
 This was a grubby beginning but it reflected the real Plahotniuc’ suc-
cess: as the NGO Freedomhouse and Transparency International (2017) 
observed, the premier and the speaker of parliament were now also in his 
hands, “an unusual concentration of power” of a party whose ranking at 
the 2014 election was only fourth. As mentioned, the DPM was further 
strengthened by 22 MPs ‘crossing floor’ from the Liberals and Com-
munists.15 In May 2017 the coalition broke up and the PLDM was replaced 
by the socialists (PSRM). Again, the majority of the ministers were ap-
pointed by the DPM, that is: Plahotniuc. 
 It bodes ill for the anti-corruption reforms in particular when it concerns 
the implementation of the reform laws that have been enacted since 2009. 
 In the first place, there is the reform of the Prosecution Office, August 
2016. First there is the questionable appointment of the Prosecutor General 
Office: Mr. Harunjen having an income and property mismatch and other-
wise a low performance in his previous job in the Anti-corruption Prose-
cution Service. To this comes the appointment of the deputy chief anti-
corruption prosecutor with also a low skills score and a comparable asset 
declaration problem (Gribincea, 2017: 4). These officials manage the Anti-
corruption Prosecution Office (APO) consisting of 50 prosecutors’ posi-
tions: nine filled thus far. While it is the intention that they will handle 
high-level corruption cases, 75% of the cases are still petty corruption cases 
(Gribincea, 2017; Prohnitchi, 2018; Stefan et al., 2018). Meanwhile APO’s 
budget lacks special funds to be used for special investigation activities. 
APO is further burdened by a too broad mandate under which it must also 
deal with cases that have nothing to do with corruption, such as fraud in 
the private sector or terrorist finances (Stefan et al., 2018: 14. APO’s sta-
tistics look good, but its workload does not reflect a real prioritisation cor-
rupt state capture. 
                                                          
14  https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2017/moldova 
15  By joining the Alliance for European Integration the communist defectors 
showed no qualms to forsake their pledge to the voters to steer Moldova to-
wards Putin’s Eurasia. 
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 Thus far, the attention for high-level corruption cases looks very biased: 
prosecution and conviction of members of the ruling parties and their as-
sociates are hard to find (one example, deputy minister of Economy, Tri-
boi, March 2017 (TI et al., 2017, ). This reinforces the impression that the 
anti-corruption system is mainly used against opponents.   
 
 
The “guardian institutions” 
 
The Moldovan legal system is not without ‘guardian institutions’ whose 
functions are enshrined in law. But the question is not whether there are 
sufficient regulations, but how they are implemented. The following sec-
tions provide an outline of their functioning. For a proper evaluation more 
data are not available. 
 
a. The National Anti-Corruption Centre 
 
The NAC resulted from a reorganisation of the Center for Combating Eco-
nomic Crimes and Corruption in 2012 and became an independent central 
public organisation, directly under the responsibility of the parliament. It 
is tasked to prevent, investigate and combat corruption and related of-
fences. It has a personnel of 350 officers: among them 40 staff for preven-
tion and ten analysts.  
 The political responsibility for the NAC is the (DPM dominated) par-
liament. According to Gribincea (2017) this is reflected in the investigation 
pattern: no corrupt DPM members or officials have been arrested with the 
exception of the Minister of Economy, Valeriu Triboi and Minister of Ag-
riculture, Eduard Grama.16   
                                                          
16  Triboi bought a building for a low price from a state enterprise and had it ren-
ovated by other state enterprises. That was known for years. But now another 
development may have plaid a role in bringing this to the open: a gas deal with 
Ukraine or Transnistria. The minister favoured the Ukraine agreement, but was 
arrested just before concluding it, preventing the deal. A few months later the 
gas agreement was made with Transnistria after all (TI, et al., 2017; p. 27-28). 
 Grama was arrested in relation to a contested land deal, and was detained for 
72 hours. http://www.moldova.org/en/minister-agriculture-eduard-grama-ar-
rested-72-hours-corruption-charges/ 
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 NAC issued a Progress Report 2014-2015, which has also a chapter 
with a series of quantitative findings. Unfortunately the statistics are rather 
crude and elementary and must be used cautiously. Obviously they concern 
only concern detected cases. One can assume here a high ‘dark number’: 
most types of corruptions are consensual. Moreover, who will report a sat-
isfactory criminal transaction to the authorities that are generally distrusted 
anyhow.  
 In the two reporting years the NAC detected 1.031 cases of corruption 
or corruption related crimes of which 66% were rated as “severe and ex-
tremely severe”; 24% as “less severe” and 10% as “minor”. However, these 
qualifications are not operationalised, neither in terms of damage or in 
terms of affected morality.  
 Unfortunately the report does not provide a breakdown of these three 
severity categories over other variables, such as the suspected persons or 
the type of public services in which detected cases of corruption happened.  
   The data of the report indicate that more than 50% of the input consists 
of cases against police officers, doctors and ‘individuals’. The text of the 
NAC report does not allow further differentiation, devaluating this statis-
tical effort. 
 On a few subjects the NAC report provides us some interesting 
glimpses on sanctioning, also in relation of the size of the bribes. Of the 
585 cases reviewed by the courts the judges pronounced in 83% a guilty 
verdict. If a prison sentence was imposed this was in 31% suspended. 
 The amount of money involved in the bribery seems modest: on average 
€ 1.161 in 2014 and € 2.751 in 2015. However, without a frequency distri-
bution, a breakdown by other variables and the values of the medians, these 
figures rather raise the question why such an analysis has not been carried 
out. The same applies to the strange finding of the NAC that there is an 
inverse relationship between the value of the bribe and the fine imposed. 
With a bribe sum of less than € 2.500 the relation between bribe and fine 
is 1:4; with a bribe between € 2.500 and € 5.000 the relation is 1:1; but with 
a bribe exceeding € 5.000 the relationship changed to 4:1. The higher the 
bribe, the lower the fine. This finding goes at the heart of the principle of 
equality of justice.    
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b. The Anticorruption Prosecution Office 
 
The prosecution of corruption offences is naturally in the hands of the Pros-
ecution Office, which was reinforced by the new Law on Prosecution Ser-
vice of 2016, a (slow) follow-up of the 2011 Justice Sector Reform Strat-
egy. The law strengthened the independence of the prosecutors. To lower 
the ‘temptation’ the salary of was doubled. An anticorruption Prosecution 
Office was established, intended for cases of high-level corruption cases.  
 Unfortunately this is an illustration of a successful reform on paper but 
failing in the implementation. The earlier mentioned appointment of the 
Prosecutor General Harunjen (see pp. 384, 387 and 399) head of the previ-
ous Anti-corruption Prosecution Centre raised suspicions. Summarised: lit-
tle zeal; undeclared wealth and after a hasty procedure he was sworn in 
behind closed doors (Gribincea, 2017: 3). The selection of the deputy, also 
with a wealth-declaration issue and moderate ranking (a third place) cannot 
be considered as inspiring. It may be too early for a judgement, but 
Gribincea’s (2017) observation that 75% of the workload of these special-
ised prosecutors still consists of small case strengthens the impression of 
another half-baked reform.  
 
c. The National Integrity Authority 
 
While the NAC is a law enforcement criminal law institution, the new 
broad integrity organisation will be the National Integrity Authority. This 
body, established by law in 2016, should result from the reorganisation of 
the National Integrity Commission to be accomplished by the Integrity 
Council. However, this did not appear to work. For unexplained reasons 
various deadlines for carrying out tasks were extended. It also proved dif-
ficult to fill the position of (deputy) president leading to substantial delays. 
In its annual survey of the governance of Moldova 2018, Freedom House 
concludes to a failure for 2017 and a “lack of political will” (which is rather 
a Plahotniuc issue) to see through the NIA reform and fight corruption. 
 According to Transparency International (2018: 2):  
“more than one year after the adoption of the laws from the Integrity 
Package, their implementation did not go further than organizing the 
competition to fill the positions of Chair and Vice-Chair of the NIA, the 
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procedures not yet being finalized. Obviously, delaying the reorganiza-
tion of this institution jeopardizes the process of control of wealth and 
personal interests.” 
 
Perhaps the latter point is this issue at stake: processing the almost 65.000 
declarations of assets and interests. Asset declaration can be an important 
tool for furthering integrity – if heeded at all. However, the landscape has 
changed and not in favour of this integrity tool. In an earlier section (p. xx) 
we pointed at the Capital Amnesty Law (August 2018) allowing a post hoc 
declaration of hidden (criminal) assets which will then be taxed by only 
3% of its declared value. Though not mentioned explicitly, this seems at 
odds with the assets and interests declaration. Why report assets when all 
the fruits of corruption and other profitable crimes can be legalised by fill-
ing a form? The opposition and (western) foreign partners have expressed 
their concern that this act may turn Moldova into a laundering hub for the 
region and beyond. Given the experience with the Russian Laundromat no 
an exaggerated worry. 
 Meanwhile the National Integrity Authority is struggling to get born by 
an apparently disinterested political midwife. Against the background of 
this Capital Amnesty Law, the question arises whether the National Strat-
egy of Integrity and Anticorruption (SNIA) for 2017–2020 (and within it 
the NIA) should be taken seriously in the first place (Prohnitchi, 2018).  
 
d. Independent media: shedding and shunning light 
 
The relation between corruption and the media is not a direct one. In our 
formal definition the concept of ‘media’ has no place unless the chief editor 
of a newspaper or TV station is bribed in their capacity of decision makers. 
However, that is a too formal approach. One of the functions of the media 
is shedding light on political or societal importance. The opposite, shun-
ning light, is the built-in consequence of integrity breaches. Hence, for the 
corrupt elite capturing the media is an important requirement to keep the 
light out. It is therefore no accident that we so often find the mention of 
‘behind closed doors’, behind which there is no room for a free press. Apart 
from closing doors there are smarter ways to neutralise the free media. 
How does that look like in this mono-garchy?  
 The simplest and legal approach is to establish a news firm oneself; then 
to take over an ailing company; or to increase influence on supervisory 
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bodies and to get a grip on the revenue side of the media: the advertisement 
market. If that does not work sufficiently, old-fashioned Soviet means can 
be used: physical and psychological intimidation of journalists, such as as-
saulting, having journalists a few days detained by a willing police unit, 
stalking, spying and death threats, also against relatives (Freedom House, 
2017: 8; 2018: 8). 
 Freedom House observes in their 2017 and 2018 reports a continuation 
of a near monopoly of Plahotniuc’ news corporations, whether printed, ra-
dio or through television. He owns or controls through his proxies (his fa-
voured mode of operation) four out of five nation TV stations, cable tele-
vision channels, and three radio stations and controls a number of newspa-
pers. His share of the media market is estimated between 60-70%. In addi-
tion he has a firm grip (about 70%) on the advertisement market, enabling 
him to put pressure on displeasing new stations as well as the state media 
regulator. In individual cases he can also make cable operators cut disa-
greeable broadcasts: putting the ‘television on black’ (Caɫus, 2017: 40- 
41).17 Of course, there is a law against media concentration, which is, how-
ever, circumvented by nominating straw men.  
 As a result, a ‘light shunning’ media system has developed to protect 
the interests of a small elite or to hide their deeds. The media actors them-
selves do not need to be directly bribed. A manipulation of advertising rev-
enues, a captured police and judiciary and occasionally beating up a jour-
nalist, does not require bribing.   
 
 
Final state: the mono-garchy  
 
Given the available documentation about the legislative, the judiciary and 
the executive, as well as business conglomerate, Moldova differs clearly 
from the oligarchic power network of the neighbouring Ukraine 
                                                          
17  This happened on 20 January 2016, when Moldtelecom controlled by Plahot-
niuc blocked the signal of TV stations covering protests against the new gov-
ernment of Filip, Plahotniuc’s nominee as Prime Minister. Another kind of in-
terference occurred 27 August 2016: Moldova 1, cut covering independence 
day as soon as protesters showed up (Caɫus, 2017: 40). 
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(Konończuk et al., 2017; Caɫus, 2016a). In this country a plurality of oli-
garchs persevered in maintaining a precarious balance of power, though 
the clan around Yanukovich lost its influence. In contrast, in Moldova the 
struggle for political dominance has (thus far) resulted in one surviving 
oligarch, Plahotniuc. So instead of an oligarchy one can speak of a mono-
garchy. This does not mean a return to a one party system which would 
formalise his power. Surveying the way Plahotniuc has operated since he 
reanimated the small Democratic Party after the Voronin era, one can ob-
serve that he uses to work via proxies. He is no office holder but a busi-
nessman who is just also acts as the chairman of the DPM.  But otherwise 
he is rarely at the front line. While protecting his business interests by po-
litical means he remains unaccountable, but still in control.  
 What are the consequences of this state of the country? The positive 
side is that compared to the instability during the power sharing with co-
oligarch Filat, a certain stability has returned. However, this is a stability 
with stagnation, to protect business interests of one clan 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Moldova a small country with a big problem: it had to make a difficult 
transition into the post-Soviet world. It has been hampered by a poorly 
performing economy, outdated laws, the dominance of oligarchs and the 
lack of ‘political will’ of the political elite to tackle endemic corruption. 
More precise, the oligarchy stands in the way of any reform that may harm 
their interests. However, in this country, one rather uses the plural term – 
oligarchs. There is only one oligarch of any importance and influence left: 
Mr Vlad Plahotniuc. His rival oligarchs are either disgraced or in jail or 
both. He is the puppet master for the entire country – nothing is decided or 
done without he says so (Caɫus, 2016b; Rahman, 2017: 6). 
There is institutional weakness everywhere in Moldova. In particular 
the judiciary is weak and corrupt. The judiciary can act corruptively and 
engage in embezzlement and money laundering and again there are few 
convictions. Judges with low rankings can still be promoted to senior po-
sitions just because they are acceptable to Plahotniuc. Outspoken person-
alities in the judiciary are at risk of being harassed by allegations of wrong 
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doing and the initiation of criminal investigations. After having caused pro-
fessional and personal damage, these investigations usually come to an un-
explained halt.  
 The banking sector is weak and prone to be victimized or undermined 
by internal corruption. The Laundromat case is a telling example. A billion 
dollars can disappear from the banks and hardly anyone is held accounta-
ble. Serious asset recovery has thus far not been undertaken. Who cares? 
There are institutional ‘guardians’ against corruption. But the NAC and 
the Anti-corruption Prosecution office handled thus far mainly ‘small fry’.  
The National Integrity Authority still demonstrates embarrassing delays. 
These institutions appear to be weak and less than transparent. It is very 
difficult to find any reports about their activities and any sort of accounta-
bility. Critics from civil society are of the opinion that the ‘guardian’ insti-
tutions are kept deliberately weak by appointing mediocracies in the lead-
ing ranks, especially in the system of justice and law enforcement. 
The EU had made the transfer of final tranches of its aid funds depend-
ent on real progress in judicial reform. Apart from such pressure, the EU 
should do more concerning training and expertise on the ground in Mol-
dova to assist civil society involved in the fight against corruption. 
 Meanwhile, the reality on the ground is that nothing will happen against 
the interests of Plahotniuc and his clan, despite his unpopularity: in opinion 
polls 95% of interviewees say they distrust him (Caɫus, 2016b). If there is 
any chance of removing this obstacle, it will come from civil society that 
has to be strengthened. 
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